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United States v. Winstan Renewed Government Liability
Arising from the Savings and Loan Crisis?
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government stands in a unique position when it en-
ters into a contract. The government enjoys this unique position
because it possesses the power to create laws that will affect contracts
to which it is a party.! In some instances, the government may pass a
law that renders the government's contractual obligations illegal, or
impossible to perform. When a change in a law renders a contract
between two private parties impossible to perform, the legal doctrine
of impossibility discharges those private parties from their obligation
to perform the contract. The law releases private parties from li-
ability for breach in this situation because those parties have no
control over the change in law or the resulting breach.4 Obviously,
this rationale for releasing private parties from liability when a
change in law renders their contract impossible to perform does not
apply when the government is a party to a contract. The government,
unlike a private party, does possess control over changes in the law.5
In United States v. Winstar Corp.,6 the United States Supreme Court
explored the government's unique position as a party to a contract.
More specifically, the Court examined the government's liability to
private parties when a change in the law alters the government's con-
tractual obligations.7  In doing so, the Court balanced the
government's need to honor its contractual obligations against the
public's interest in new legislation!
1. See K. McKay Worthington, Note, Is Your Government Contract Worth the Paper
It's Written On? An Examination of Winstar v. United States, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
119, 119 (1996).
2. The government has been permitted to pass laws that discharge itself from unfa-
vorable contracts without any penalty for breach of contract because of its need to
safeguard the public welfare. See id. at 124.
3. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTs § 9.5, at 701 (2d ed. 1990); see also
Worthington, supra note 1, at 119.
4. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 701.
5. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 124.
6. 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
7. See id. at 2439.
8. See id. at 2438.
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
In Winstar, the Court considered whether the government was
liable for damages resulting from breach of contract.9 Glendale Fed-
eral Bank, FSB (Glendale), the Winstar Corporation (Winstar), and
the Statesman Group, Inc. (Statesman) claimed that the government
contracted to allow them special regulatory treatment for supervisory
goodwill,0 but the government subsequently discharged itself from
the contract by passing new regulations." The government asserted
two defenses denying liability for any damages related to the breach
of contract claims. First, the government argued that the unmis-
takability doctrine blocked its liability." Under this doctrine, the
government is not liable for breach when new legislation modifies a
contract unless at the time the government entered into the contract
it surrendered the right to enact such future legislation 3 in unmistak-
able terms.4 Second, the government argued that the sovereign acts
doctrine blocked its liability for breach of contract. Under this de-
fense, the government cannot be held liable for passing legislation
designed to protect the public welfare." A plurality of the United
States Supreme Court rejected both defenses and concluded that the
government was liable for its breach of contract.
1 6
This Note first discusses the facts 7 and procedural history 8 of
Winstar. It then reviews the background of the government's two
primary defenses: the unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines. 9
Following an examination of these two doctrines, this Note analyzes
the Winstar Court's treatment of these defenses and analyzes the is-
sues that affect the plurality's decision."' Finally, this Note considers
the precedential effect of Winstar, not only to the other thrifts that
were similarly affected by the government's decision to discharge it-
self from its contractual obligations, but also to the government's
9. See id. at 2437.
10. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
11. See id at 2440.
12. See id. at 2437.
13. Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989, which made enormous changes to the structure of federal thrift regulation.
See id. at 2446.
14. See id at 2448.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 2440.
17. See infra notes 22-77 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 120-68 and accompanying text.
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scope of liability in general."
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Since its first crisis during the Great Depression, the savings
and loan, or "thrift," industry has become "one of the longest regu-
lated and most closely supervised" industries in the nation.' The
regulatory regime passed by Congress to stabilize the industry
2 4
worked reasonably well while inflation was low, the economy re-
mained healthy, and the nation continued to grow.' However, the
thrift industry entered its second crisis in the late 1970s and early
1980s as high inflation and high market interest rates caused the in-
terest rates that thrifts paid to depositors to exceed the interest rates
that thrifts received from their mortgages.2 As a result of the dispar-
ity between interest revenues and interest paid to depositors, thrifts
failed at alarming rates.
In the early 1980s, at a time when one-third of the nation's thrifts
were insolvent or financially troubled,2 the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) did not have sufficient funds to close
all the institutions deemed insolvent.29 As an alternative to depleting
21. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
22. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2440 (1996) (noting that, in
the first thrift crisis during the Great Depression, forty percent of the nation's home
mortgages went into default, approximately 12,000 thrift institutions failed, and deposi-
tors in the failed thrifts lost $200 million).
23. Id. (quoting Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245,250 (1947)).
24. Three statutes were passed during the crisis to stabilize the industry. See id. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Act created the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank
Board). See id. (citing Ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1421-1449 (1988 ed.))). The Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933 authorized the Bank
Board to charter and regulate federal thrifts. See id (citing Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1988 ed.))). The National Housing Act
created the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), under the Bank
Board's authority, to insure thrift deposits and regulate all federally insured thrifts. See
iL (citing Ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750g
(1988 ed.))).
25. See id.
26. See id. The thrifts entered into long-term, fixed rate mortgages during periods of
low market interest rates. See id. In order to attract depositors, the thrifts had to pay
interest rates that exceeded the rates of their long-term mortgages. Worthington, supra
note 1, at 121.
27. Worthington, supra note 1, at 121. As a result, 435 thrifts failed between 1981
and 1983. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2440. The failure of the 435 thrifts amounted to the fail-
ure of one out of every seven thrifts. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 120 n.6.
28. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 35 (1992).
29. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2441. Already failed savings and loans threatened to
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the limited insurance funds of the FSLIC, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (Bank Board) encouraged healthy thrifts to acquire the
failing thrifts in a series of "supervisory mergers."' The regulators
hoped that the healthy thrifts would be able to revive the failed
thrifts while simultaneously relieving the FSLIC of its responsibility
to reimburse depositors' funds.31 To make the thrift industry a more
attractive business opportunity, the Bank Board and the FSLIC de-
regulated the industry and weakened the requirement that thrifts
maintain adequate capital reserves as a cushion against losses.32
The Bank Board developed new "regulatory accounting princi-
ples" (RAP) which replaced generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) for the purposes of determining compliance with regulatory
capital requirements.3 Critically, the RAP permitted the acquiring
thrifts to use the excess purchase price over the fair value of all iden-
tifiable assets' as an intangible asset called either "goodwill" or
"supervisory goodwill."35 The new RAP, which were later character-
exhaust the regulator's insurance funds. See il Total reserves declined from approxi-
mately $6.5 billion in 1980 to $4.6 billion in 1985, while the Bank Board estimated that it
would take approximately another $16 billion to close all thrifts deemed insolvent under
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). See id, By 1988, the FSLIC was insol-
vent by over $50 billion. See id.
30. See id at 2442; see also Michael W. Clancy, 1995 Year in Review: The Federal
Circuit's Government Contracts Decisions, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 537,588 (1996).
31. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 121.
32. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2441. Regulatory capital requirements are the percent-
age of depositor funds that thrifts need to retain. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 28,
at 284. The capital requirements are set up to protect depositors and the deposit insur-
ance fund. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2445. Capital requirements are a cushion against
insolvency. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 28, at 284. Capital adequacy regulation
requires thrifts to maintain sufficient capital against their assets. See id.
33. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2441. The Financial Accounting Standards Board
adopted the regulatory accounting principles for the acquisition of failing savings and
loans associations in Financial Accounting Standards No. 72. See id. at 2445.
34. In a free market, a purchaser "would not pay a price for a business in excess of
the value of that business' assets unless there actually were some intangible 'going con-
cern' value that made up the difference." Id. at 2442 (citing M. Lowy, HIGH ROLLERS:
INSIDE THE SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 30 n.5 (1991)).
35. Id at 2442-43. "Goodwill" is an asset only on a business's balance sheet. See id
at 2445. Goodwill is valueless when a thrift fails because it is not cash, and cannot be used
to pay off creditors. See id The use of goodwill to satisfy capital requirements meant
there was less real capital being used to satisfy capital requirements. Therefore, with the
FSLIC lacking the funds necessary to pay off the creditors, taxpayers will need to pick up
the tab if a thrift fails. See id However, goodwill was necessary because the mergers
hinged on the acquiring institutions using the resulting supervisory goodwill for capital
adequacy purposes. See Philip Meyer, Supreme Court is Extremely Active on Banking
Issues, 15 BANKING POL'Y REP. No. 3, at 2, 4 (1996). In most cases, the resulting or
merged thrift would have immediately been insolvent under the federal standards had
supervisory goodwill not counted toward the regulatory capital requirements. See Win-
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ized by Congress as "accounting gimmicks," were significant depar-
tures from GAAP.36 The gimmicks instituted by RAP reduced
capital requirements and hid the worsening financial condition of the
industry." The RAP enabled many weak institutions to merge with
healthier institutions. These mergers allowed the weak institutions to
continue operating. 8
Winstar involved three "supervisory mergers" in which the gov-
ernment induced investors to acquire failed or failing thrifts.39 In
each merger, the FSLIC and the Bank Board entered express con-
tracts with investors.4° The contracts permitted the investors to use
supervisory goodwill to meet the regulatory capital requirements for
the newly merged thrifts.4 ' By allowing the newly merged thrifts to
rely upon supervisory goodwill to satisfy their capital requirements,42
the mergers saved millions of dollars for the government.43
In September 1981, the first "supervisory merger" at issue in
Winstar was born. Glendale, a profitable and well capitalized thrift,
was approached by the Bank Board about a possible merger with
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward County,
which had a negative net worth of over $734 million." The Bank
star, 116 S. Ct. at 2443. In addition, as permitted by GAAP, the thrifts were allowed to
amortize the supervisory goodwill over periods as long as forty years. See id. Since su-
pervisory goodwill did not exist forever, the thrifts needed to amortize or reduce its worth
periodically. See id. In addition, goodwill has sometimes been described as negative net
worth since liabilities exceed assets. Under the basic principle that assets equal liabilities
plus net worth, with liabilities being greater than assets, the net worth would result in a
negative amount.
36. Winstar Corp. v. U.S., 994 F.2d 797, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993), rev'd en banc, 64 F.3d
1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
37. Thrifts that should have failed were allowed to survive even though the thrifts
were not required to maintain adequate capital reserves as cushions against losses. See
Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2441.
38. See id.
39. The Court of Federal Claims consolidated the cases of Winstar Corporation,
Glendale Federal Bank, and Statesman Bank and Savings into United States v. Winstar
Corporation, et al. See id at 2447. In order to preserve the remaining funds of the
FSLIC, the FSLIC solicited investors to acquire the troubled thrift. See id. at 2450.
40. See Clancy, supra note 30, at 588.
41. See i The FSLIC developed lists of perspective acquirers, made presentations,
held seminars, and generally tried to promote the acquisitions of these insolvent thrifts.
See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2442 n.3.
42. If the thrifts failed to meet regulatory capital requirements, the thrifts will be
subject to penalties imposed by the regulators. See id. at 2449.
43. See Clancy, supra note 30, at 588. The government estimated that the Glendale
merger alone saved the government approximately "three quarters of a billion dollars."
Id. at 588-89.
44. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2448. Glendale estimated that the Bank Board needed
approximately $1.8 billion to liquidate the failed thrift and only approximately $1 billion
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Board agreed to allow Glendale to amortize approximately $716 mil-
lion as supervisory goodwill over a forty year period and an
additional $18 million as supervisory goodwill over twelve years. '5 If
the bank board had not permitted Glendale to use supervisory good-
will to satisfy its regulatory capital requirement, the merger would
not have been possible because the newly created thrift would not
have met the regulatory capital requirements.'
In 1984, the second "supervisory merger" at issue in Winstar
arose. In this merger, the FSLIC solicited bids for the acquisition of
Windom Federal Savings and Loan Association (Windom), a thrift in
danger of failing.47 A group of private investors, with a capital con-
tribution of $2.8 million, formed Winstar to acquire Windom.4' In
addition to a $5.6 million contribution from the FSLIC, the new Win-
star corporation was allowed to amortize the supervisory goodwill
that resulted from the merger for a period not to exceed thirty-five
years. 9 As with the new thrift formed in Glendale, the new Winstar
thrift would have been subject to regulatory noncompliance and pen-
alties from the moment of its creation if the supervisory goodwill had
not been permitted to satisfy part of the thrift's regulatory capital re-
quirements.'
Finally in 1988, the third "supervisory merger" under scrutiny in
Winstar evolved. Statesman approached the FSLIC about acquiring
an insolvent thrift." The FSLIC ultimately persuaded Statesman to
acquire an additional three failing thrifts in exchange for government
assistance with the acquisition of all four thrifts." In acquiring all
four thrifts, Statesman agreed to make a capital contribution of $21
million, and the FSLIC contributed an additional $60 million in
cash. 3 In addition, Statesman was allowed to use approximately $700
million of supervisory goodwill generated by the merger as capital to
meet its regulatory capital requirements. 4 Statesman was also al-
was recoverable through the sale of the failed thrift's assets. See id.
45. See Winstar v. U.S., 994 F.2d 797, 804 (Fed. Cir. 1993), rev'd en banc, 64 F.3d
1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
46. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2449.
47. See id at 2450. If Windom was allowed to fail, the estimated liquidation cost for
the FSLIC was approximately $12 million. See id
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id
52. See id at 2450-51.
53. See id at 2451.
54. See Winstar v. U.S., 994 F.2d 797, 804 (Fed. Cir. 1993), rev'd en banc, 64 F.3d
1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
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lowed to treat $26 million of the FSLIC's $60 million contribution as
permanent capital credit to the new thrift's regulatory capital." As
with Glendale and Winstar, Statesman would have immediately
failed to meet regulatory capital requirements had the government
not agreed to permit both supervisory goodwill and capital credit to
be used as part of Statesman's regulatory capital requirements. 6
However, despite the potential success of these supervisory
mergers, thrifts continued to fail7 and Congress passed the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA)58 to replace the FSLIC and the Bank Board with the Of-
fice of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).9 The FIRREA required the OTS to "prescribe
and maintain uniformly applicable capital standards for savings asso-
ciations."' The most relevant aspect of the FIRREA to the three
thrifts in the Winstar case was the OTS's requirement to limit the in-
tangible assets that the FSLIC and Bank Board permitted thrifts to
include as regulatory capital.61 The FIRREA replaced RAP with
three new regulatory capital requirements that each thrift needed to
meet.62 First, in the calculation of "core" capital," supervisory good-
55. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2451. A permanent capital credit resulted when the
FSLIC contributed cash to a merger and subsequently permitted the thrift to count the
FSLIC's contribution as a permanent credit to the thrift's regulatory capital requirement.
See id. at 2444. Because the thrift also counted the cash received toward its capital re-
quirement, the thrift was able to double count FSLIC's cash contribution toward its
regulatory capital requirements. See id.
56. See Winstar, 994 F.2d at 804.
57. See Clancy, supra note 30, at 589; see also Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2446.
58. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(1)-(3),(9) (1994).
59. With the FSLIC $56 million in the red and consumers fearing the instability of the
thrift industry, Congress felt compelled by the "precarious financial condition" of the
thrift industry to introduce sweeping legislative reform. See Winstar, 994 F.2d at 804
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101 Cong., 1st Sess. 292, 302 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 98). However, the regulatory response to the crisis in the thrift industry
"actually aggravated the decline." See Transohio Savings Bank v. Director, Off. of Thrift
Supervision, 967 F.2d 598,602 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
60. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
61. See Winstar, 994 F.2d at 804. The government preferred tangible assets because
losses are absorbed by institutional owners, while with intangible assets, such as supervi-
sory goodwill, losses are essentially borne by the taxpayers. See id. at 801. At the time,
supervisory goodwill accounted for $18 billion in regulatory capital. See id. at 805 (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101 Cong., 1st Sess. 292, 497 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
86,293).
62. See Worthington, supra note 1, 123; see also Winstar 64 F.3d at 1538.
63. "Core" capital is defined as "core capital as defined by the Comptroller of the
Currency for national banks, less any identifiable assets, plus any purchased mortgage
servicing rights excluded from the Comptroller's definition of capital." Worthington,
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will was strictly limited. Moreover, the amount of supervisory good-
will permitted was to decrease each year and was to be entirely
eliminated from the calculation of core capital by December 31,
1994.6' Next, supervisory goodwill was not permitted to be counted at
all in determining "tangible" capital, which is defined as core capital
minus any intangible assets." Finally, supervisory goodwill was per-
mitted to be counted as part of "risk-based" capital,66 but the
amortization of the goodwill was limited to twenty years.67
With the limit on the ability of thrifts to include supervisory
goodwill as regulatory capital under the FIRREA, Winstar, States-
man, and Glendale soon failed to meet the new statutory capital
requirements." Because the three thrifts failed to meet these new
requirements, they were all subject to immediate seizure by the gov-
ernment.69 Federal regulators seized and liquidated Winstar and
Statesman as a result of their noncompliance with the new regulatory
capital requirements. Although Glendale also did not meet the
capital requirements, it avoided seizure."' Because the three thrifts
"believ[ed] that the Bank Board and [the] FSLIC had promised them
that the supervisory goodwill created in their merger transactions
could be counted toward regulatory capital requirements, [the three
thrifts] each filed suit against the United States ... seeking monetary
damages on [breach of contract] theories. '
The government asserted two defenses in response to the thrifts'
suits.' First, the government asserted the unmistakability doctrine
supra note 1, at 123 n.24.
64. See Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1538; see also Worthington, supra note 1, at 123.
65. See Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1538; see also Worthington, supra note 1, at 123.
66. FIRREA provided that risk-based capital "may deviate from the risk based capi-
tal standards applicable to national banks to reflect interest rate risk and other risks."
Worthington, supra note 1, at 123 n.26.
67. See Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1538; see also Worthington, supra note 1, at 123.
68. See United States v. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2447 (1996). FIRREA's new poli-
cies have caused over 500 savings and loans to fail to meet one or more of the three
capital requirements. See William K. Black, Ending Our Forebearer's Forebearances:
FIRREA and Supervisory Goodwill, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 102, 107 (1990).
69. See Winstar, 116S. Ct. at 2447.
70. See id.
71. Initially, Glendale was able to avoid seizure only through massive private capi-
talization. See id. at 2447.
72. Id. The three thrifts filed suit for breach of contract. See Clancy, supra note 30,
at 589.
73. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2448. The Supreme Court decided that the government
could assert two other defenses. See id. The other two defenses were the rule that an
agent's authority to make such surrenders must be delegated in express terms, and the
doctrine that a government may not contract to surrender certain reserved powers. See
id. The other two defenses were rejected based on similar arguments for why the gov-
1997]
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and claimed that before the government must legally surrender sov-
ereign or legislative authority, such terms must appear in the contract
in unmistakable terms.' By raising the unmistakability doctrine, the
government contended that unless the government unmistakably
agreed not to enact legislation or regulations that would change their
contracts, the contracts were subject to subsequent statutory and
regulatory changes.7 Second, the government asserted the sovereign
acts doctrine and claimed that a government's sovereign acts do not
give rise to a claim for breach of contract.76 By raising the sovereign
acts doctrine, the government contended that its contractual obliga-
tions were relieved because the legislation was necessary to protect
the public welfare."
Rejecting the government's defenses, the Court of Federal
Claims granted the three thrifts summary judgment for breach of
contract. 8 The court rejected the government claims "that the
[g]overnment could not be held to a promise to refrain from exercis-
ing its regulatory authority in the future unless that promise was
unmistakably clear in the contract, and that the [g]overnment's al-
teration of the capital reserve requirements in the FIRREA was a
sovereign act that could not trigger contractual liability. 79
A divided panel of the Federal Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, re-
versed the Court of Federal Claims decision.? The panel reversed
the lower court's decision because the risk of a subsequent change in
the regulatory capital requirements was not allocated to the govern-
ment in an unmistakably clear manner.81 Thus, the circuit court
found that the thrift institution assumed the risk of subsequent
changes in legislation.' Furthermore, the Federal Circuit not only
concluded that the FIRREA legislation fell within the sovereign acts
doctrine and absolved the government from liability for breach of
contract.?3 However, in a 9-2 decision, the full Federal Circuit, sitting
ernment's unmistakability did not apply. See id. at 2461.
74. See &L
75. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
affd, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
76. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2463.
77. See Winstar, 64 F.3d at 1545.
78. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447.
79. Id.
80. See id. The Court of Federal Claims consolidated the three cases and certified its
decision for interlocutory appeal. See id.
81. See id,
82. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ), rev'd en
banc, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
83. See id.
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en banc, reversed the divided panel of the circuit and affirmed the
trial court's ruling on liability. 4
The full court, agreeing with the trial court, rejected the gov-
ernment's unmistakability argument by holding that the
unmistakability doctrine had no application in a suit for money dam-
ages.' In addition, the full court rejected the government's sovereign
acts defense because the FIRREA's new capital requirements
"singled out supervisory goodwill for special treatment" and there-
fore could not be said to be a "public" and "general act" within the
meaning of the doctrine.86 Chief Judge Archer, writing for the ma-
jority, concluded that Winstar had negotiated a contract with the
federal regulators that permitted the thrift to record supervisory
goodwill as regulatory capital, and the government failed to perform
its contractual obligation.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Federal Cir-
cuit court's decision." Justice Souter announced the decision of the
Court and delivered the plurality opinion." Seven of the justices rec-
ognized that the government was liable for damages because it
breached its contracts with the three thrifts.' The seven justices, in
concluding that the government beached the contracts with the three
thrifts, rejected the government's defenses of the unmistakability and
the sovereign acts doctrines.9"
84. See Winstar, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
Circuit Judge Rich, who voted in the divided panel to reverse the Court of Federal Claims
decision, voted with the majority to affirm the Court of Federal Claims in the full court
opinion.
85. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447.
86. Id.
87. See Case Comment, Contracts-Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and En-
forcement Act-Federal Circuit Holds Federal Government Liable for Breech of Thrift
Contracts, Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F3d 1531 (Fed Cir. 1995) (en banc), cerL
granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996), 109 HARV. L. REv. 1162, 1163-64 (1996). The dissent ar-
gued that the majority misapplied the sovereign acts doctrine. See id. at 1164. The
dissent also argued that the government was acting in its role as a sovereign, and not as a
contractor, when it passed FIRREA. See id. at 1165.
88. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447.
89. Justices Stevens, Breyer, and O'Connor joined the opinion of Justice Souter. See
id. at 2440. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, filed an opinion con-
curring in judgment. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Ginsburg joined in most part. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 2438.
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HI. BACKGROUND LAW
The unmistakability and the sovereign acts doctrines were cre-
ated to place the government on equal footing with private parties.92
While the government should be free to address the public welfare
through new legislation, the government should not be able to avoid
compliance with costly, inconvenient or disadvantageous contractual
obligations by outlawing its own performance under the contract.93
Therefore, the judiciary has attempted to craft rules that leave the
government in a position no better or worse than that of a private
contractor. To equalize the government's contracting powers with
those of a private party, the courts utilize both the unmistakability
and sovereign acts doctrines.
A. Unmistakability Doctrine
The unmistakability doctrine protects the government from un-
willingly committing itself to withhold its legislative prerogative in
the future.95 The Supreme Court has held that the "sovereign power,
even when unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all con-
tracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction, and will remain intact
unless surrendered in unmistakable terms."' In Jefferson Branch
Bank v. Skelly,97 the Supreme Court held that the bank was free from
taxation imposed by subsequent legislation because the contract right
to be free from taxation was "expressed in terms too plain to be mis-
taken."98 However, the Court declared in Bowen v. Public Agencies
Opposed to Social Security Entrapment" that "contracts should be
92. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 127. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the
unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines are not entirely separate principles. See
Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2485 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For further discussion of the way
in which the doctrines provide for equal footing, see infra notes 94-118 and accompanying
text.
93. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 127.
94. Id. at 124-25.
95. See id. at 129.
96. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,
52-53 (1986) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982)).
97. 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1861).
98. Id. at 446.
99. 477 U.S. 41 (1986). In Bowen, California brought suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of an amendment to the Social Security Act preventing states from withdrawing
from the old age, survivors and disability insurance benefits program if the states were
participating on the effective date of the amendment. See id The Supreme Court held
Congress had the authority to amend the agreement. See id. The Court held no contract
existed since the original Social Security Act reserved Congress the power to amend the
act. See id. at 51-52.
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construed, if possible, to avoid foreclosing exercise of sovereign
authority.""' Therefore, unless specifically addressed in the contract,
the government reserves its right to legislate, even if new legislation
will impair its contracts with private parties.'
The government relied on the unmistakability doctrine in Win-
star in part because of an unorthodox interpretation 2 of the
unmistakability doctrine in Transohio Savings Bank v. Director, Of-
fice of Thrift Supervision."' In Transohio, the D.C. Circuit
interpreted the doctrine as requiring "one who wish[es] to obtain a
contractual right against the sovereign that is immune from the effect
of future changes in the law must make sure that the contract confers
such a right in unmistakable terms.""' The D.C. Circuit held that be-
cause the contract did not specifically prohibit subsequent legislation,
no breach occurred upon the passage of subsequent legislation.'5
However, the Federal Circuit in Winstar did not agree with the D.C.
Circuit's interpretation.' 6 The Federal Circuit held that the govern-
ment could be liable for breach of contract even if a contract did not
specifically prohibit subsequent legislation. 7 The split between the
circuits regarding the unmistakability doctrine set the stage for the
Supreme Court's analysis in Winstar."8
B. Sovereign Acts Doctrine
Just as the unmistakability doctrine may serve as a defense for
government parties charged with breach of contract, the sovereign
acts doctrine stands for the proposition that the "United States as a
contractor cannot be held liable directly or indirectly for public acts
of the United States as a sovereign."' '  The doctrine balances the
government's need for freedom to legislate with its obligation to
honor contracts."0 In Horowitz v. United States,"' the Supreme Court
100. Id. at 52-53.
101. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 131.
102. See idt at 132.
103. 967 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
104. Id. at 618.
105. See id. at 614.
106. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 133.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Amino Bros. Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 485, 491 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (citing Hor-
owitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925)).
110. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432,2438 (1996).
111. 267 U.S. 458 (1925). Horowitz is the classic example of the sovereign acts doc-
trine. In Horowitz, the New York Ordinance Board was relieved of liability caused by a
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acknowledged that under the sovereign acts doctrine, the government
may act in two separate capacities: as a sovereign and as a contrac-
tor.12 As a sovereign, the government is protected when it acts to
protect the public's welfare."3 The government is immune from li-
ability as long as its acts do not "specially ... alter, modify, obstruct
or violate the particular contracts into which it enters with private
persons."'" 4
In Winstar, the government raised both of these doctrines as de-
fenses. The Court, however, held that neither doctrine relieved the
government of its liabilities."5 The four justices in the plurality con-
cluded that neither of these doctrines applied to this case."6
Although the remaining five justices stated that both doctrines did
apply in this case, the five justices were split regarding the effects of
the doctrines."7 Justice Scalia, writing in concurrence, stated that the
doctrines did not foreclose the thrifts' claims."' Chief Justice
Rehnquist, however, stated that these defenses relieved the govern-
ment of its liabilities." 9 Because of the disagreement among the
Justices, the status of both doctrines to relieve the government of li-
ability remains uncertain.
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE
In Winstar, Glendale, Winstar, and Statesman entered into con-
tracts with the federal government that expressly allowed the use of
delay in delivering a shipment of silk because the government's decision to place an em-
bargo on the shipment of silk was the result of the government's "public and general acts
as a sovereign." Id. at 461.
112. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 127. As a sovereign, the government promotes
the general welfare. See id When acting as a contractor, the government makes enforce-
able promises to private parties. See id.
113. See id The government argued that a sound regulatory capital requirement is
fundamental in "promoting the safety and soundness of individual institutions and ulti-
mately the stability of the [nation's] financial system." Winstar Corp. v. United States,
994 F.2d 797, 801 (Fed. Cir. 1993), rev'd en banc, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116
S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
114. Horowitz, 267 U.S. at 461 (quoting Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383, 384
(1865)) (emphasis added). The act provides the government protection from facing li-
ability beyond which a private party would face due to changes in contract duties resulting
from a change in law. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 127. However, the government is
liable when it legislates with the specific purpose of changing the terms of one of its con-
tracts. See id. at 127-28.
115. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2438-39.
116. See id at 2438.
117. See id. at 2477 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). For further discussion, see
infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
118. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2477 (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment).
119. See id. at 2485 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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supervisory goodwill and capital credits to satisfy regulatory capital
requirements."m Although federal regulators do not usually permit
supervisory goodwill and capital credits2' to satisfy the regulatory
capital requirements,'" the Bank Board and the FSLIC permitted the
acquiring or merged institutions to use supervisory goodwill and capi-
tal credits to satisfy their regulatory capital requirements after
lengthy negotiations and as part of the inducement to acquire the
failing thrifts."2 The government and the three thrifts performed
their contracts under the terms for many years'24 before the govern-
ment decided to forbid the inclusion of these items as regulatory
capital."
Despite the existence of the valid contract, in 1989, with the en-
actment of the FIRREA, the government decided to unilaterally
change the terms of the contracts and disallow over 300 thrifts from
including supervisory goodwill and capital credits as regulatory capi-
tal.'2 In subsequent suits brought by the three thrifts, they did not
claim that Congress could not change the terms of their contracts
with the government,' 2' rather they sued the government for breach
of those contracts.'1
The government defended its actions by relying on both the sov-
ereign acts doctrine and the unmistakability doctrine. On these
issues, the Winstar Court divided three ways: (1) the plurality con-
cluded that the contracts at issue were "risk-shifting agreements"'129
that were nothing more than promises by the government to pay any
losses arising from any regulatory changes;"3 (2) the concurrence
concluded that the unmistakability doctrine applied precisely to the
120. See id. at 2438.
121. For a description of capital credits, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
122. Supervisory goodwill and capital credits cannot be used .by the government to pay
off creditors when a thrift becomes insolvent. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2444-45.
123. See Id. at 2445.
124. The contracts were performed by the parties from the year in which Glendale,
Winstar, and Statesman entered into their agreements to acquire a thrift to 1989 when
FIRREA was enacted. For example, the government performed under the terms of its
contract with Glendale for eight years from 1981 to 1989.
125. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2446.
126. See id.
127. Some thrifts tried to enjoin the enforcement of FIRREA. See Worthington, supra
note 1, at 131. Despite some success at the district court level, this strategy uniformly
failed at the circuit court level. See id.
128. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2447.
129. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
130. This group consists of Justices Souter, Stevens, Breyer, and O'Connor. See Win-
star, 116 S. Ct. at 2438.
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situation, but did not relieve the government of liability;3' and (3) the
dissent concluded not only that the unmistakability doctrine relieved
the government of liability, but also that the plurality's opinion sig-
nificantly reduced the government's defenses in contract disputes. '
Ultimately, the Court decided not to eliminate the unmistakability
and sovereign acts doctrines, but instead merely limited the scope of
the two doctrines so that neither applied to this case.
Despite concerns that the plurality's opinion "drastically re-
duce[d] the scope of the unmistakability doctrine, ... and limit[ed]
the sovereign acts doctrine so that it will have virtually no future ap-
plication,"3 3 the plurality's decision had limited effects on the two
doctrines.'" Instead of deciding the case under the two doctrines, the
plurality merely held that they did not apply to this situation.
First, the plurality dismissed the government's sovereign acts
doctrine defense, stating that the government's alteration of the
regulatory capital requirements was not a "public and general act." '35
The plurality questioned whether the passage of the FIRREA was
meant to advance a broader public interest.'36 The dissent, noting
that capital reserves protect the FSLIC's insurance funds, suggested
that the regulations were changed to protect the government in a ca-
pacity that was analogous to a private insurer.37 In addition, the
plurality stated that "allowing the [g]overnment to avoid contractual
liability merely by passing any 'regulatory statute,' would flaunt the
general principle that, 'when the United States enters into contract
relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the
law applicable to contracts between private individuals.' ""'
Next, the plurality, emphasizing that the contracts were solely
risk-shifting agreements,'39 stated that the unmistakability doctrine
131. Justice Scalia argued this view, and was joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas.
See id. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
132. The view was espoused by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Justice
Ginsburg. See id. at 2479 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
134. The plurality disagreed with the dissent's argument that the plurality's ruling
reduced the scope of the unmistakability doctrine, but instead argued that the govern-
ment's position would represent a conceptual expansion of the unmistakability doctrine
beyond its historical and practical warrants. See id. at 2459.
135. Id. at 2463.
136. See id. at 2464.
137. See id.
138. Id at 2464-65 (quoting Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,579 n.39 (1933)).
139. See idL at 2458.
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did not apply to the contracts with the three thrifts.'" The plurality
held that the contracts were risk shifting agreements because the
thrifts did not challenge the government's ability to change the regu-
latory requirements,14 ' but instead the thrifts claimed that the Bank
Board and the FSLIC were contractually bound to recognize supervi-
sory goodwill.'42 As Justice Souter explained in the plurality opinion,
"[s]o long as such a contract is reasonably construed to include a risk-
shifting component that may be enforced without effectively barring
the exercise of that power, the enforcement of the risk allocation
raises nothing for the unmistakability doctrine to guard against, and
there is no reason to apply it."'43
Despite the seemingly clear rationale, the concurring and dis-
senting justices have criticized the plurality's opinion for going
beyond precedent and also for being untenable.1' 4 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing in dissent, responded to the plurality's "newly
minted distinction" as not only contrary to the unmistakability doc-
trine, but also untenable.1 45 Even Justice Scalia, who concurred in the
judgment of the plurality, questioned the plurality's emphasis on risk-
shifting agreements.'" Justice Scalia noted that the plurality's ap-
proach had no basis in case law, and questioned whether the
approach was valid under contract law. Justice Scalia, like the
Chief Justice, believed that the unmistakability doctrine applied in
140. See id. at 2453.
141. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
142. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2452. The thrifts simply claimed that the government
assumed the risk of subsequent changes in the law and agreed to pay any damages as a
result. See id at 2453. The plurality noted that Congress expressed a willingness to guar-
antee the acquiring thrifts against loss that might occur from the supervisory mergers. See
id. at 2459 (citing 12 U.S.C. 1729 (f) (2) (1988 ed.) (repealed 1989)). Supervisory goodwill
was permitted as regulatory capital to relieve the taxpayers the burden of paying for the
liquidation of the failed thrifts. Surely from the agreement in which the thrifts negotiated
for goodwill to be included as regulatory capital, the thrifts did not assume the liabilities
of the failed thrifts. The thrifts negotiated for the very supervisory goodwill that the gov-
ernment contended made the government at risk for failed thrifts. Therefore, the
agreement to allow supervisory goodwill as regulatory capital only continued the gov-
ernment's liability for the failed thrifts, and did not shift the risk to the thrifts. The
government was attempting to make the thrifts cover the liability.
143. l at 2457-58.
144. Tenable is defined as meaning capable of being defended. See THE MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY 703 (1974).
145. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2480 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Despite concerns about the
basis of the plurality's decision, Justice Scalia concurred in judgment because, in his view,
the thrifts established, in unmistakable terms, that the government promised to regulate
them in a particular fashion. See id. at 2477.
147. See id. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
1997]
382 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 1
Winstar.
14
Despite the criticisms, the plurality defended its position by em-
phasizing the need to maintain the credibility of the government as a
contractor. 149 Specifically, the plurality focused on whether private
contractors should be denied damages unless they satisfy the unmis-
takability doctrine."5  Justice Souter stated that injecting the
unmistakability doctrine "into every common contract action would
... produce the untoward result of compromising the government's
practical capacity to make contracts.'' Had the Court reached the
opposite conclusion and allowed the government to release itself
from its contract without liability, the credibility of the government
as a contractor'52 would have been undermined.'53 The result would
be increased costs for the government whenever it entered into con-
tractual agreements.&4  The plurality, therefore, gave limited
consideration to the unmistakability doctrine.
To further support its decision not to apply the two doctrines to
this situation, the plurality emphasized that its decision served the
interest of fairness and equity.'55 The plurality noted that the federal
regulators, unable to offer cash to induce the healthy thrifts to ac-
quire the failing thrifts, resorted to supervisory goodwill as "an
indispensable tool" to induce healthy thrifts to merge with sick
ones.56 The government's decision to "magically" allow liabilities to
148. See id at 2477 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
149. See id. at 2459.
150. See iL at 2459.
151. Id.
152. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 119 (noting that everyday the government en-
ters into tens of thousands of contracts with aggregate values of hundreds of millions of
dollars).
153. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2459.
154. See id. at 2459 n.29 (noting that if the government were allowed to break its con-
tracts, then the result would be higher costs as other parties would include default
premiums in future government contracts).
155. See id. at 2442 (noting that the Bank Board encouraged healthy thrifts to take
over failing thrifts). In general, the FSLIC tried to promote the acquisition of the insol-
vent banks. See id. at 2442 n.3. The FSLIC developed lists of prospective acquirers, made
presentations, and held seminars to encourage the acquisition of the failing thrifts. See id.
The efforts of the FSLIC were successful and resulted in many supervisory mergers,
thereby helping the government avert paying billions in bailout funds. See Winstar Corp.
v. United States, 994 F.2d 797, 816 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Newman, J., dissenting) ), rev'd en
banc, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996). Thus, between 1980 and
1986, over 300 mergers occurred and only 48 liquidations took place. See Winstar, 116 S.
Ct. at 2442 n.3.
156. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2443. However, the healthy thrifts were not forced to ac-
quire the failing thrifts, the healthy thrifts voluntarily acquired the failing thrifts to make
money. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
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be converted into assets was not one that it wanted to make, but was
one that was necessary to keep the FSLIC solvent. I7 If the thrifts had
been allowed to fail, the government would have liquidated the failed
thrifts. The plurality noted that Congress enacted the FIRREA,
which had the effect of breaching the government's contracts with the
thrifts and reversing the FSLIC's decision to include supervisory
goodwill as regulatory capital requirements, only when the crisis in
the thrift industry continued and the FSLIC became insolvent."5 8 Ul-
timately, the plurality recognized that in all fairness and justice, the
government should be barred from forcing a few to bear the burden
of its failed attempt to save the thrift industry, when the public as a
whole should bear that burden."9
In addition, general equities support the plurality's decision.
The thrifts accepted great risks when they "bailed out" the govern-
ment during the thrift crisis because the government had a propensity
to make changes in regulatory capital requirements."6 With the
healthy thrifts realizing that they were unable to meet the required
capital requirements at the time of merger,'61 Justice Souter stated, "it
would have been irrational [for the thrifts] to stake [their] very exis-
tence upon continuation of current policies without seeking to
embody those policies in some sort of contractual commitment."' 62
Therefore, the plurality concluded that they "have no doubt that the
[thrifts] intended to settle regulatory treatment of these transactions
as a condition of their agreement[s]."1 63
Because the plurality's opinion merely held that the unmis-
takability and sovereign acts doctrines did not apply to this situation,
the decision should not expand the government's scope of liability for
breach of contract beyond the thrift industry as the concurring and
dissenting justices feared.' Therefore, the decision did not result in
bane) (Nies, J., dissenting), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
157. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
158. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 122 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 54(l), 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 292 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 88-89).
159. See id at 2459. The new capital requirements end up punishing the very institu-
tions that came to the government's aid. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797,
816 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Newman, J., dissenting), rev'd en banc, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir.
1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996). If the mergers had not taken place, then the public
would have had the burden of liquidating the thrifts.
160. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2449.
161. Seeid. at2443.
162. Id. at 2449.
163. Md
164. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. The Winstar decision exposed the
government to billions of dollars in damages for breaching contracts that allowed thrifts
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"sweeping changes" that cast "uncertainty" on when the government
will be liable for failing to fulfill its contractual obligations,' and the
government will not be liable for virtually every contract in the event
of nonperformance.' Thus, when faced with an issue similar to that
in Winstar, the government can continue to defend its actions with
both the unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines. Although the
Winstar decision does leave uncertain the Supreme Court's position
on when the government is liable for breach of contract,67 the true
impact of the Winstar decision can only be determined with future
litigation.'68
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Winstar decision may increase the amount of liti-
gation concerning the government's liability for failing to fulfill its
contractual obligations,'69 the plurality's decision in Winstar correctly
to use supervisory goodwill to satisfy their regulatory capital requirements. See Supreme
Court Upsets Government Repudiation on Supervisory Goodwill, 15 BANKING POL'Y REP.
No. 14, at 2 (1996); see also Clancy, supra note 30, at 591-92.
165. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2479 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
167. The decision left many questions unanswered. The most important is the ques-
tion of when the unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines apply? Additional
questions are how much did the decision in fact expand the government's scope of liabil-
ity? How much weight should be given to the plurality's opinion when five justices
expressed disagreement with the plurality's opinion?
168. See id. at 2479 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the unmistakability doc-
trine and sovereign acts doctrine have been drastically reduced in scope and virtually
eliminated, respectively).
169. A substantial amount of additional litigation may be needed to determine the
appropriate amount of damages in Winstar. Although it appears that the government will
owe restitutional damages, the courts will need to determine whether the government
also needs to pay consequential damages. In its attempt to limit damages, the govern-
ment already, in brief, has filed a motion to intervene in 46 of the 120 goodwill cases
being heard by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. R. Christian Bruce, FDIC Tries To
Take Over As Plaintiff In Forty-Six Supervisory Goodwill Suits, 67 BANKING REP. (BNA)
No. 16, at 714-15 (Oct. 28, 1996). The motion to intervene was a major threat to investors
and shareholders who stood to gain from the Winstar decision, because if the government
is successful in naming itself as the plaintiff, the government will have little incentive to
sue itself, and the current plaintiffs will be "left out in the cold." Id. The government
sought to intervene, because when the thrifts failed, the government was put into receiv-
ership. Since the government became the receiver, the government argues that it "owns
all of these [goodwill] claims as receiver for the failed thrifts." Id.
In addition, the government also attempts to limit its damages by posing a defense
grounded on the statute of limitations. See Banking and Finance, 65 L. WK., Jan. 21, 1997,
at 2459. The government contended that at least 26 thrifts filed their claims more than six
years after FIRREA was enacted on August 9, 1989. See id. Therefore, the government
argued that the thrifts' claims should be barred by the statute of limitations. See id. The
thrifts, however, contended that the statute of limitations did not begin until at least De-
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provided a way for the government to shoulder the costs of breaching
their contracts with the thrifts. The Winstar holding was inevitable
because the Bank Board had induced healthy thrifts to merge with
failed thrifts in an effort to maintain the solvency of the FSLIC.'70
The court recognized that it would be fundamentally unfair 17 for the
government not to be liable for breach of contract when the thrifts
were induced to come to the aid of the government. The govern-
ment's decision to breach its contracts and not to allow the thrifts to
count supervisory goodwill and capital credits toward regulatory
capital requirements was not made because of any changes in the cir-
cumstances, but was made once the government realized that the
plan to save thrifts from further failure was unsuccessful." The deci-
sion to reverse its position was made because the government felt
that including goodwill "circumvented the whole purpose of the re-
serve requirements."'" However, the government should have been
aware that supervisory goodwill circumvented the reserve require-
ments when it expressly agreed to the terms of the contracts in
question.
The plurality maintained the credibility of the government by
concluding that it was indeed liable for breach of contract in this in-
stance. By basing its decision on other factors, such as the Bank
Board's inducing the thrifts into the mergers, the plurality was not
cember 7, 1989, when the OTS's regulations implementing FIRREA became effective.
See id. Twenty-four of the 26 thrifts filed their claims prior to December 7, 1995. See id.
For the government to succeed on its claims, the government needed to show that
despite the delayed timing of the OTS' regulations, FIRREA's enactment constituted an
actual, not anticipatory breach of the contracts with the thrifts. See id. An anticipatory
repudiation "occurs when an obligor communicates to an obligee that the obligor will
commit a breach in the future." ld. The government argued that an actual breach oc-
curred because OTS was forbidden to allow supervisory goodwill. See id The federal
claims court, however, held that the claims of the 24 thrifts did not begin until at least the
OTS regulation became effective. See idL Therefore, the 24 thrifts were permitted to
proceed with their claims. See id. The court's ruling, however, did not dispose of the
government's statute of limitations claims for the two remaining thrifts. See id For the
two thrifts to overcome the government's defense, the two thrifts needed to show that
their claims did not ripen until the OTS' regulations were actually applied to them. See
id.
170. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
171. The FIRREA regulations punish the very institutions that came to the aid of the
government, these institutions not only have a case based in law, but also in equity and in
fundamental fairness. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797, 816 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (Newman, J., dissenting), rev'd en banc, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116 S.
Ct. 2432 (1996).
172. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
173. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2445. The whole purpose of regulatory capital requirements
is to protect depositors. See id. Goodwill is not cash, and when a thrift fails, goodwill
cannot be used to cover any shortfall. See id.
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only able to maintain the government's credibility, but appears also
to have limited its holding to the particular facts related to the three
thrifts. Since the situations of the three thrifts in Winstar cover
"much of the gamut of factual situations" that will be present in sub-
sequent suits by the other thrifts that were also induced by the
government to acquire failing thrifts, 4 the Winstar case provides
strong precedent for the other thrifts. However, since the plurality
was able to reach its decision without altering either the unmis-
takability or sovereign acts doctrines," it is unclear whether the
government's scope of liability beyond these thrifts is affected by the
Winstar decision. Although the plurality's opinion may lead to addi-
tional litigation to clarify the law related to government liability for
breaches of contracts, the increase in litigation is a small price to pay
for a fair decision.
RICHARD WEI
174. See Worthington, supra note 1, at 139. There were 89 FIRREA related cases on
the docket of the Court of Federal Claims as of September 1995. See Financial Institu-
tions Reform, supra note 87, at 1162. In addition, there is the potential for many more
cases as over 300 thrifts had supervisory goodwill listed among its assets at the end of
1990. See Worthington, supra note 1 at 140 (citing James M. Marks, The Goodwill
"Jackpot:" Will Thrifts Collect? Part I1 (1995)). The Winstar decision is "especially
important as precedent because the three consolidated cases ... covered much of the
gamut of factual situations that [are] present in [the other] cases." Worthington, supra
note 1, at 140. The government faces a $1.4 billion judgment against Glendale alone, and
informed estimates place the total liability of all similar cases at around $20 billion. See
id. at 140 n.128 (citing Robert A. Preskill, Glendale Bank Wins Suit against Government
over FIRREA, Corp., LEGAL TIMES, 1995, at 22.
175. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2459 (rejecting the government's position that would
result in a conceptual expansion of the unmistakability doctrine).
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